

The Relationship Between Pain and Suffering

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In every culture, medicine is grounded in the relief of human suffering. That is what patients and the public believe to be its mission. Many of us were drawn into the treatment of pain or research by the relationship of pain to suffering. Research on pain, however, does not bring us closer to an understanding of suffering. Furthermore, patients treated for serious diseases by well-meaning and competent physicians may suffer from their treatments as well as from their diseases. If the relationship between pain and suffering were better understood, our treatment would be more effective, and our research might be more closely related to the problems that first drew us to the field. Discerning the distinction and relationship between pain and suffering will, I believe, lead to the solution of other difficult problems in the care of the sick.

PAIN AND SUFFERING DISTINGUISHED

We can only know someone is suffering by observation, inquiry, or the awareness that he or she is subject to something that we believe causes suffering. Suffering, like pain, is not objectively measurable, yet it is a universally accepted category of human experience. The relationship between pain and suffering is not constant. Patients report suffering when pain is overwhelming, as with dissecting aneurysms. On the other hand, patients may tolerate very severe pain without suffering if they know the source and if they know that the pain will end or soon be relieved. For example, I have had repeated episodes of renal colic. As reputed, the condition is extremely painful, yet it has not been a source of suffering for me. I know what the problem is. I know that it is necessary to obtain adequate pain relief as soon as possible (and that in order to do this, I must stay away from hospital emergency rooms). On the other hand, even lesser pain may be associated with suffering if it is perceived as never ending or if it is believed to have a dire cause (such as

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46 cancer). Clinicians working with terminally ill patients frequently see pa-
47 tients who are grunting with pain and cannot be comforted. Often, they act
48 as if they do not hear what is said to them, and they seem unaware that they
49 are grunting. When their pain has been adequately relieved and it has been
50 demonstrated that such relief will be forthcoming if the pain should return,
51 they will frequently tolerate the same level of pain (by their report) without
52 requesting medication. Frequently, once they are assured that relief is pos-
53 sible, the suffering subsides, although the pain remains. In support of these
54 observations is the well-known fact that it is difficult to relieve the pain of a
55 terrified patient.

56 People may suffer from pain even when it is not present. Patients with
57 severe and frequent migraines may suffer from the fear that the headaches
58 will return. These headaches have repeatedly ruined what would otherwise
59 have been pleasurable or important occasions. Family relationships, jobs,
60 sports, and virtually everything that is dear to the person have been nega-
61 tively influenced by the headaches. Yet these patients obtain little sympathy
62 from family or friends. After you have said that you have a headache for the
63 thousandth time, what else is there to say? Not surprisingly, such patients
64 may be obsessed with their headaches and their attempts at relief to the
65 virtual exclusion of other aspects of life—suffering when they do not have
66 the actual pain and when they do. Patients who have terrible pain from ma-
67 lignant tumors but are now free of pain may suffer from the fear that the pain
68 will return. They may repeatedly question their doctors about the possibility
69 of the pain returning and about what will be done should that happen. For
70 some, reassurance is possible; for others, the prospect becomes a living
71 nightmare that no reassurance seems able to relieve.

72 The distinction between pain and suffering may be clarified by the case of
73 the pain of childbirth. Purely on the issue of the adequacy of pain control,
74 one would believe that epidural anesthesia would be employed everywhere,
75 but this is not the case. In fact, different modalities of pain relief are popular
76 in different parts of the United States. The more important issue seems to
77 be not the adequacy of the method of pain control, but the degree to which
78 the woman is in control of her own labor and delivery.

79 Other symptoms such as dyspnea, choking, or even diarrhea may be
80 sources of suffering if they are sufficiently severe. In fact, suffering may be
81 present in the absence of any symptoms. Parents, particularly if they are
82 helpless in the situation, commonly suffer at the sight of their children in
83 pain. Extreme poverty may be a source of suffering, as may betrayal or the
84 loss of one's life work.
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THE PLACE OF THE FUTURE

86 Notice the place of the future in all of these situations of suffering. For
87 patients with seemingly overwhelming pain, long-lasting ("never ending")

PAIN VERSUS SUFFERING

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88 pain with the accompanying fear of the inability to continue to "take it." or
 89 pain suspected of having a terrible cause, a sense of future is necessary to
 90 suffer. In each of these instances—at the moment of suffering—the pain is
 91 *not* overwhelming, the person *is* "taking it," and the *fact* of a dreadful dis-
 92 ease does not yet exist. The body knows no future and therefore cannot
 93 worry. The body cannot supply information about the future because, at any
 94 moment, for the body, the future does not yet exist. Only beliefs, memories,
 95 ideas, or fantasies can supply the information necessary to provide a "fu-
 96 ture." In other words, to suffer, there must be a source of thoughts about
 97 possible futures.

98 To summarize thus far, although suffering may attend pain, they are dis-
 99 tinct. There may be pain without suffering. There may be suffering without
 100 pain. But there seems to be no suffering without an idea of the future. Bodies
 101 do not have the beliefs, concepts, ideas, or fantasies necessary to create a
 102 future; only persons do. From the foregoing, one can conclude that, al-
 103 though bodies may experience nociception (stimuli defined as painful), bod-
 104 ies do not suffer. Only persons suffer.
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SUFFERING DEFINED

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 107 A definition of suffering is suggested by clinical experience. Suffering is a
 108 state of severe distress induced by the loss of the intactness of person, or by
 109 a threat that the person believes will result in the loss of his or her intactness.
 110 It will continue until the threat is removed or the person is reconstituted.
 111 Suffering may occur in relation to any aspect of personhood.

THE NATURE OF PERSON

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 113 The importance to pain research of the distinction between pain and suf-
 114 fering starts with the understanding that a person is not a psychological as
 115 distinct from a physical thing. Research on pain has often been carried out
 116 with a model in which the physical phenomena are considered to be distinct
 117 from psychological phenomena, especially in the sense that the physical is
 118 real and the psychological is not. The concept of person is difficult for sci-
 119 ence and for medicine. If a person is not a body (and a person is certainly
 120 more than merely his or her body), then a person is not an object of science
 121 in the classical sense. But persons are also not merely minds and so do not
 122 "belong" to psychology, philosophy, or religion. This is true if only because
 123 persons have bodies and cannot be the same person with a different body or
 124 even the same person if something major happens to the body. One can see
 125 why the mind-body duality essentially displaced the concept of person; it
 126 had no home since it was neither mind nor body. Furthermore, as we shall
 127 see, a person is not at any particular moment the entire person because a
 person always has a past and a future. Thus, rather than being completely

128 instantiated in front of an observer. a person is a trajectory through time. a
 129 historical route, to use Whitehead's term.

130 To make matters more complex. the definition of person—in the sense of
 131 what an observer means by saying of someone that he or she is a person—
 132 keeps changing. At this time and in this culture, when we speak of ourselves
 133 as persons. one of the characteristics that we value is our privacy. But in
 134 classical Greece, privacy would not have been a thing to value, but some-
 135 thing to shed as one tried to become at one with the changeless values of
 136 the universe. We also prize our individuality, our distinctness from one an-
 137 other; yet before the 11th and 12th centuries, the idea of individual people
 138 being prized for their distinctiveness seems not to have been present. One
 139 has merely to see paintings and statuary from before and after that era to
 140 notice that faces looked alike before and began to be different after. On the
 141 front of the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, the early statuary all have
 142 essentially similar faces, but later. the faces assume individual differences—
 143 more marked as the centuries went by. Political individuality is important to
 144 the notion of person in the Western democracies, yet the idea did not achieve
 145 currency until the 17th to 18th centuries. The concept of person—what is
 146 meant by the word person—continues to evolve, as is clear by the 20th cen-
 147 tury contribution to its meaning. Now it has an intensely personalized and
 148 interiorized meaning in addition to its previous content. We are proud of our
 149 differences. of our mental life, and of the importance of our individual selves
 150 in the scheme of things in a manner not previously described, understood.
 151 or accepted.

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A TOPOGRAPHY OF PERSON

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15 It is not fruitful to attempt to understand the nature of a person by a re-
 16 ductive analysis in the manner one might employ to understand the liver.
 17 But it is useful to see how many aspects there are to being a person. In a
 18 previous discussion of this subject (1), I laid out a topography of person.
 19 explaining each feature in some detail. The reader is referred to that discus-
 20 sion for more particulars. Here. let me merely list those features of the to-
 21 pography. Persons have personality and character. Some personalities and
 22 character structures tolerate some illnesses better than do others. For ex-
 23 ample, if it is essential that a person maintain a sense of being in absolute
 24 control of events and circumstances. the loss of control that often accom-
 25 panies illness can be devastating to the point of disrupting the intactness of
 26 the person. When that occurs, the person will suffer. Persons have a lived
 27 past. One's past is an active part of the present because it contributes mean-
 28 ing and interpretation to the events of the present. The present can make a
 29 lie of the past or destroy its validity. and when that occurs. the person, in
 the present. will be injured. The lived past of a person's family is also part

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30 of a person. What happened to my father, for example, the fact that he had
31 hay fever, makes quite reasonable the appearance of hay fever in me. Yet
32 strictly speaking, my hay fever has nothing to do with his. People expect to
33 follow the pattern of the parents to such a degree that often otherwise intolerable
34 illnesses may be accepted by a patient because a parent was similarly
35 afflicted. On the other hand, patients may disbelieve a diagnosis of (say)
36 cancer because no one in their family ever had it.

38 Persons have a society and a culture. I put it in that manner because our
39 society and culture are within us; we do not merely live in them as if they
40 were something external. The height of steps, the way food is taken, trans-
41 portation, dress styles, what is considered acceptable in looks and odors—
42 all of which are socially or culturally determined—may have a profound
43 effect on the experience of a sick person. It is difficult to remember, but
44 nonetheless true, that almost everything that affects the physical function of
45 the body affects its social function as well. Persons have families, and their
46 relations with their families, past, present (and future), pervade virtually
47 every aspect of life when they are well and when they are sick. Persons have
48 other relationships with friends, work associates, and casual acquaintances.
49 These may be disrupted or changed by illness. People also have relation-
50 ships with themselves. Intense, even destructive, conflicts may erupt when
51 the demands of the body in illness come in conflict with other aspects of the
52 self. For example, the need to "carry on" with work as usual may be ex-
53 tremely important to an individual, yet such continued activity may worsen
54 the illness. Much of what is considered poor compliance with medical regi-
55 mens may arise from these kinds of inner conflicts.

56 Persons have roles. Not being able to perform these roles when illness
57 occurs may destroy the person. The behavior of sick physicians is notorious
58 in this regard. But others also know and value themselves only in the per-
59 formance of their roles. When illness makes that impossible, suffering may
60 follow. Persons have day-to-day behaviors. They sleep, eat, dress, work,
61 and travel in habitual ways that are extremely durable, hardly changing from
62 day to day. Often symptoms show themselves and are recognized as symp-
63 toms by their disruption of these behaviors.

64 Persons have bodies. For some, the body is a place of hidden terrors wait-
65 ing to strike, whereas for others, it is the palace of their desires. The rela-
66 tionship with body is frequently altered by illness—patients may be enraged
67 with their bodies sufficiently to injure them, apparently oblivious of the fact
68 that, in so doing, they injure themselves. Persons have unconscious lives.
69 They are subject to motivations, fears, desires, and needs whose origins may
70 be unknown to them. For example, much has been made in the recent cancer
71 self-healing movements of the notion that cancer occurs because of some
72 unconscious need on the part of the patient.

73 All persons have political dimensions, power relationships with the polity,
within the institutions in which they work, and with each other. Illness de-

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74 stroy personal power and may produce devastating feelings of powerless-
 75 ness. Every person has a secret life with ideas, thoughts, fantasies, and
 76 needs that are not part of the continuum of the public person. Although
 77 sexual factors are most commonly associated with the secret life, they are
 78 not necessarily its only content. One is reminded of the movie *The Secret*
 79 *Life of Walter Mitty*, of years back, in which the meek protagonist lives a
 80 life of heroic exploits in his fantasies. Illness may destroy such dreams. It
 81 may also separate someone from a real but secret relationship that is the
 82 only thing that has made an otherwise bitter life endurable. When that hap-
 83 pens, the sick person suffers a double loss; of the loved one and of public
 84 comfort for the loss. Every person has a future in which he or she believes.
 85 Serious illness destroys those beliefs. All persons have transcendent dimen-
 86 sions—connections to others, to religious beliefs, to their country, or to
 87 other things larger and more enduring than themselves. These can give
 88 meaning to their lives and even make illness and death acceptable. Their
 89 absence induces a terrible state of personal meaninglessness and
 90 hopelessness.

90 As I noted earlier, suffering may occur in relation to any aspect of person.
 91 Put another way, each of these aspects of person is like an extremity or
 92 organ that is subject to damage and that, when damaged, injures the whole.
 93 No one part of a person is separate from the others. We are of a piece.
 94 Change one part of us and all the other parts—including the body—also
 95 change. This is in part because a person is not a thing but a trajectory
 96 through time and space, a cohesive process whose appearance and existence
 97 at any moment is determined not only by its remote past but what has hap-
 98 pened to any part of it the moment before. We are better at describing ob-
 99 jects; there is not a good language for process. Any time one attempts to
 100 describe a person, the description seems complex or confusing because it
 101 must always be given in process terms—in the terminology of change. This
 102 should not deter us from trying always to understand persons in terms of
 103 process—change over time—because pain is also a process, something that
 104 never holds still but instead changes through time.

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF PAIN TO PERSON

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107 It is a source of confusion that the process of pain does not exist indepen-
 108 dent of persons. In a recent review of pain in newborns, the author acknowl-
 109 edges that pain and nociception are not the same thing, but then uses the
 110 two terms interchangeably. The error is common and understandable, but
 111 an error nonetheless. When it is acknowledged that pain is something ex-
 112 perience by persons and is different from nociception, it is occasionally
 113 implied that pain does not exist. Pain, in this view, is merely a report, and
 only the report exists. It has also been suggested that pain is culturally rel-

114 ative—that some experiences are reported as pains in some cultures but not
115 in others. Others have pointed out that some pains are experienced as ec-
116stasy and thus are not really pain. Most of this is nonsense arising from the
117 confusion between the experience of something and the meaning that is as-
118 signed to it. To unravel these confusions, it is useful to dissect the experi-
119 ence into its parts.

120 Certain kinds of stimuli elicit the sensory response of nociception (in the
121 absence of abnormalities of the nociceptive apparatus) now and forever, in
122 every culture. The sensory response is perceived. (At least for the time
123 being, disregard consciousness, which is a confusing element.) As such, the
124 sensory response is an event for the perceiver. *All* events are assigned mean-
125 ing. That is to say, all events must be integrated into the experience of the
126 perceiver—they cannot, except by the most difficult act of conscious will,
127 float free and unexplained. A percept, of which we are speaking, is a percept
128 of something. Pain is not a something unless it is the pain of something.

129 Meaning, as used here, includes both significance and importance. The
130 significance of something is what the thing implies. Dark clouds imply rain.
131 This pain signifies something sticking me. That chest pain signifies heart
132 disease. The importance of a thing is its value. The rain signified by the dark
133 clouds will ruin our picnic—or conversely, save our crops. The sticking that
134 the pain implies is from a pin in my dress, a matter of little importance. But
135 the sticking might also be a scorpion. Both senses of meaning—thus, mean-
136 ing in general—are derived from the aspects of person discussed earlier.
137 That is, we know the implications of things from past experience, family
138 history, relationships, experience with our bodies, and so on. The aspect of
139 meaning that is the importance of the event—the value dimension—also
140 arises from all aspects of the person.

141 Assigning meaning to events continues the pain process by doing two
142 things: influencing perception and predicting the future. As the sensory re-
143 sponses to the stimuli continue to be perceived, they are intensified or sup-
144 pressed, contrasted or blended (with other responses) to intensify and sup-
145 port the significance that the process has been assigned or (less commonly)
146 to weaken and make uncertain the original interpretation. Usually sensory
147 material that puts in doubt the perceived implication will tend to be sup-
148 pressed. Awareness is focused by meanings that are important. The spotlight
149 of awareness further influences perception and at the same time reinforces
150 or changes meaning. This further influence on perception may occur at the
151 sensory level or at the level of transmission of the nociceptive message.

152 Meaning also predicts; it is a statement about the future. All beliefs have
153 a future term. Even beliefs about apples not only tell about them in some
154 static definitional sense, but also include where they come from and what
155 they become. For example, "cancer pain is horrible," "the pain of burns
156 becomes . . .," "coccygodinia continues on and on." The prediction fur-
157 ther influences the perception. Given the choice between interpreting new
158 events as trivial or threatening, people often assign the worst possible mean-
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159 ing. Because of this tendency, patients frequently present histories of pain
 160 in which only those factors that support a fatal diagnosis are remembered,
 161 whereas the facts that would allow a nonthreatening diagnosis are sup-
 162 pressed. (Fortunately, the original sensory impression remains to be reelic-
 163 ited and reinterpreted. If this were not the case, patients' histories might be
 164 worse than useless instead of the irreplaceable sources of information about
 165 the past that they are.)

13 A statement about the future may contain a threat, as in the belief that
 14 cancer pain is unendurable. When the threat is sufficient, the person will
 15 believe that his or her intactness *as a person* is in danger. At that point,
 16 suffering ensues. Suffering influences perception by changing the individu-
 17 al's total focus toward the source of suffering. The entire apparatus of per-
 18 ception and the assignment of meaning then contributes to the suffering. As
 19 this occurs, the person begins to adapt to the threat, and the nature of the
 20 person starts to change. This entire process must be seen as occurring in
 21 little droplets of complex experience strung out along a thread of time that
 22 may occupy minutes or years.
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THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PAIN

24 Pain and suffering are phenomena that *cannot* be understood if mind and
 25 body are held to be separate. From the point of view of a classic concept of
 26 science, the inability of researchers to hold pain in their hands as an object
 27 separable from the person who has the pain is an overwhelming disadvan-
 28 tage. It makes the truly scientific study of pain *impossible*—not difficult, but
 29 impossible. Until now, recognition of this difficulty seemingly has not been
 30 accepted by pain researchers. Mostly they have attempted to force pain back
 31 into the classic scientific mold by blinding themselves to the individual na-
 32 ture of pain sensation and by acting as if nociception and pain were the same
 33 thing. It makes no sense to keep denying the fundamental nature of the pain
 34 experience in an attempt to force it and its study into the reductionist para-
 35 digm. It makes no more sense to attempt to force its understanding or re-
 36 search into psychologistic ways of thought as if pain were a "mental" or
 37 psychological phenomenon in the narrow meanings of those terms. To force
 38 it into these boxes is to lose the great opportunity for understanding the
 39 human condition that the investigation of pain and suffering offer. System-
 40 atic studies of pain are entirely possible, but they must be seen as what they
 41 are, belonging to the realm of the social sciences rather than the biological
 42 sciences. (Studies of nociception or its components, however, would remain
 43 part of the biological sciences.) In all of this, it is not the nature of pain that
 44 is the problem—pain, after all, is what it is and has always been. The diffi-
 45 culty arises because people keep trying to understand pain using tools that
 46 were not designed for its study but that were perfected for problems like ion

47 flux through membranes. Because of the importance of pain as well as the
48 nature of pain, pain can also be seen as a phenomenon that provides the
49 perfect arena for the study of: (a) whole persons; (b) process as opposed to
50 isolated events; and (c) the interactive (feedback) nature of human process—
51 the influence of the person's past, roles, family, culture, and other personal
52 factors on the process. I have, throughout this chapter, made assertions
53 about pain and the origin of suffering, its nature, and relief that are based
54 primarily on clinical observation but that are open for systematic study. The
55 modern temptation to go to the molecular basis for everything must be
56 avoided if pain and suffering are to be understood. Again and again, I have
57 listened to discussions that start out at the level of human suffering and end
58 up with presentations about the molecular mechanism of nerve transmission.
59 It is no trick to avoid the complex by discussing the simpler level of orga-
60 nization; the real accomplishment is to explain the complex phenomenon
61 (human suffering) by what has been worked out at a simpler level, for ex-
62 ample, nociception.
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THE RELIEF OF PAIN AND THE RELIEF OF SUFFERING

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How should clinicians like myself regard a patient in pain? Let me reiter-
65 ate the steps in the process. A noxious stimulus produces its special sensory
66 response. The resulting sensation is perceived by the person, who immedi-
67 ately begins to add meaning. The meaning influences the perception and
68 perhaps the sensation itself. Subsequently (on a moment by moment basis),
69 further meanings and behaviors are elicited in response to the continued
70 sensation. In consequences of conscious awareness, the perception of pain
71 is either increased or decreased. This continuing process entails attempts,
72 up to and including seeking help, to reduce the stimulus and the sensation.
73 The efforts to reduce the pain, in themselves, have an influence on its per-
74 ception and its meanings that feed back into the process. If the threat to the
75 person is perceived to be great enough to endanger his or her intactness,
76 suffering ensues.

Even in this abbreviated description, the relief of pain and, more impor-
77 tant, the relief of suffering clearly can be attempted at any, more than one,
78 or all the steps in the process. The source of the pain—the stimulus—may
79 be removed or reduced. The sensation can be diminished. Perception may
80 be altered. The meaning attributed to the perception can be changed. Be-
81 haviors in response to the pain can be altered. Or finally, the person can be
82 encouraged to change in ways that alter the threat and restore intactness.
83 The time scale of the interventions and their specifics depends on whether
84 acute or chronic pain is involved. With pain of any severity, source, or du-
85 ration, the central principle is that intervention can occur at *any* point in the
86 process of the generation of pain and suffering. Guided by that postulate,
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88 the possibility of relieving pain and suffering—which is the fundamental
89 mandate of medicine—is vastly increased.
90

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